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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAWCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL YOUTH
CORRECTIONS ACT IN ITS APPLICATION TO
YOUTHFUL CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
Defendant, a minor, was found guilty of the theft of a radio-clock
from a government reservation and was committed to the custody
of the Attorney General of the United States for from four to six
years under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA).' The maximum penalty that could have been imposed on an adult for the
same offense under normal criminal procedures was a sentence of one
year. Defendant filed a motion in a federal district court to correct
the sentence, alleging that the imposition of this greater sentence resulted in a violation of his rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. From an adverse judgment, defendant appealed. Held, affirmed. Congress can make reasonable distinctions as
to treatment of criminal offenders of different age groups, and the
application of the FYCA to effect a sentence of greater duration than
could be imposed under normal criminal procedures does not amount
to a violation of due process. Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d
467 (5th Cir. 1958) .2
The primary purpose of the FYCA is to promote the rehabilitation
of those who are under the age of twenty-two at the time of criminal
sentencing. 3 The theory of the act is that retributive punishment of
such offenders should be eliminated in favor of a system of training
and treatment designed to correct antisocial tendencies. 4 Further, it
affords a discretionary guide to federal judges in the sentencing of
such offenders. The rationale of Congress in enacting the FYCA is
more clearly discerned when it is noted that in many respects its
provisions are similar to the existing federal release procedures relative to probation and parole. 5 Prior to the enactment of the FYCA in
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1952).
2. Judge Rives, in dissenting, agreed that the FYCA was constitutional on
its face, but reasoned that its application in this particular case was such that

there was a violation of procedural due process in that defendent was not
informed, at the time he waived counsel and pleaded guilty, that he could be
sentenced for more than one year. 256 F2d at 473-74.
3. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950).
4. Ibid.

5. In 1925 Congress passed the National Probation Act, and Chief Justice
Taft stated that its objective was "the giving to young and new violators of
law a chance to reform and to escape the contaminating influence of association
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1950, several states had adopted similar legislation,6 California being
the first state to so legislate with the passage of the Youth Authority
Law 7 in 1941. In 1943 the California Supreme Court, in In re Herrera, 8
ruled on the constitutionality of this statute. The court decided that
there was no violation of the fourteenth amendment 9 even though a
person committed to the Authority might remain in its custody for a
longer period of time than one convicted of the same offense through
normal criminal process.' 0 In 1947, Minnesota enacted the Youth
Conservation Act" which is very similar to the FYCA. One of the
first cases to arise under this act was State v. Meyer. 2 There an
eighteen-year-old defendent pleaded guilty to burglary and was sentenced under the statute.13 The defense raised the objection that the
act violated federal due process in that it deprived the defendent of
his rights to credit for good conduct available to older offenders under
normal penal sentences. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in upholding the constitutionality of the statute, stated: "There is always some
discrimination when classification is based on age, but so long as the
classification has some reasonable basis it cannot be held unconstitutional on that account." 14 Thus far, the instant case is the only ruling
on the constitutionality of the aforementioned discrimatory provisions
in the FYCA.
The court in the instant case pointed out that the FYCA was designed for the corrective treatment and rehabilitation of offenders, not
with hardened or veteran criminals ...." United States v. Murray, 275 U.S.
347, 357 (1928). Like commitment under the FYCA, probation is granted at
the discretion of the judge, but this must be done before the defendant has

begun serving his term. Theoretically probation may be granted to any person except where the punishment imposed is life imprisonment or death. The
probation period cannot exceed five years, but, as under the FYCA, it may run
longer than the maximum period for which the defendent could have been
imprisoned. The federal parole system was credited in 1910, and under its provisions any eligible prisoner can apply for parole after serving one-third of his
sentence. A "parole board" in the Department of Justice, rather than a judge,
is the final approving authority. In contrast to the FYCA and probation procedures a person cannot be paroled for a longer period of time than that for
which he was sentenced. However, as with offenders under the FYCA, a
parolee is carefully supervised. Each person released is required to file a
written report at least once a month, and is under the continuing supervision
of a probation officer. 1 U.S. ATT'Y GEN. SURVEY OF RELEASE PFOCEDURES (1939).
6. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1700-83 (Deering 1952); M1ss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 120 §§ 1-26 (1957); M__N.STAT. ANN. §§ 242.01-.54 (Supp. 1958);

WIs. STAT. ANN.§§ 54.01-.38 (1957).
7. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1700-83 (Deering 1952).
8. 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P.2d 345 (1943).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "Nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
10. 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P.2d 345 (1943).
11. M NN.STAT. ANN. §§ 242.01-.54 (Supp. 1958).
12. 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949).
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.01-.54 (Supp. 1958).
14. 37 N.W.2d at 14.
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for their punishment.15 Through the act, the defendent was here
furnished with the opportunity to escape from the psychological shocks
associated with serving an ordinary penal sentence. Under these circumstances the court could find no constitutional reason why Congress
could not make general distinctions between treatment of different
age groups. It was noted that similar provisions in state statutes had
been upheld as not violating due process. 16 The court also added that
the FYCA did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment inasmuch as it operated in the same manner on all per17
sons belonging to the same general class.
The result reached in the instant case in understandable when it
is considered that the primary purpose of the FYCA is rehabilitation.
The interests of society as well as the defendent may be better served
by sentencing him to the custody of the Attorney General for six
years rather than placing him with hardened criminals for one year.
Also, treatment accorded under provisions of the FYCA is flexible and
can be adjusted to needs of the particular defendent. If it is deemed
desirable by the Attorney General, the youth may never be confined
at all. In passing the FYCA, it was noted by Congress that existing
methods of treating criminally inclined youths were not adequately
solving the problem of rehabilitation. 18 The act is an experiment designed to meet this need.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE POWERINFRINGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTIES BY
DEMANDS OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MEMBERSHIP LISTS.
The Florida Legislative Investigation Committee was created to investigate organizations within the state which might cause violence or
disturbance.' The Committee served the petitioner with a subpoena
15. Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d, 467, 471 (5th Cir. 1958).
16. Id. at 472.

17. Id. at 473.

18. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950).

1. FLA. LAWS 1957, ch. 57-125. The pertinent provisions of the act are as
follows:

"Section 2. It shall be the duty of the committee to make as complete
an investigation as time permits of all organizations whose principles or
activities include a course of conduct on the part of any person or group
which constitute violence, or a violation of the laws of the state, or would
be inimical to the well-being and orderly pursuit of their personal and
business activities by the majority of the citizens of this state.
"Section 3. (1)

The committee is authorized ...

to require by subpoena

or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such
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duces tecum requiring him to produce all books, records, and membership lists of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and the Florida Council for Human Relations. The
petitioner moved in the circuit court to quash the subpoena, contending
that it violated his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
of the United States Constitution. 2 On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Florida from an order denying the motion to quash, held, affirmedA court will not determine in advance whether an order by a legislative investigating committee to produce books, records, and membership lists is a violation of constitutional guaranties. In re Graham,
104 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1958).
Incidental to their lawmaking function, legislative bodies have an
inherent power of investigation,3 and with the rightful exercise of that
power goes the authority to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 4 and the production of documentary evidence.5 However, the
power to investigate is not without its limitations.6 It has long been
held that the legislature's power to investigate is subject to judicial
review, 7 and many courts will allow a petitioner to test the validity of
a subpoena duces tecum issued by a legislative investigating committee
by entertaining motions to quash.8 The legislative inquiry is also
limited to that which is relevant and pertinent to the subject authorized to be investigated, 9 but the courts are generally reluctant to inpapers, books, and documents ... as it may deem necessary in the performance of its duties."
2. Although not expressly stated by the court, the inference is that the
petitioner alleged an infrigement of due process guaranties under the fourteenth amendment, and violation of the first amendment right to freedom of
association.
3. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 248 Ala. 590, 29 So. 2d 10 (1947); Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J.
53, 71 A.2d 327 (1950); State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 191
P.2d 241 (1948); 49 Am. JuR. States, § 40 (1943).
4. Ex parte Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725 (1929); Ex parte Caldwell, 61
W. Va. 49, 55 S.E. 910 (1906). See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927).
5. Ex parte Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725 (1929); Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 530, 73 A.2d 433 (1950); International Ry. v. Mahoney, 271
App. Div. 283, 64 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1946); In re Joint Legislative Comm. to Investigate Educ. Sys. of New York, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769 (1941).
6. See United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Penn. 1936); Morss v.
Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957); Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d
612 (1938); Ex parte Hague, 105 N.J. Eq. 134, 147 Atl. 220 (1929). For a discussion of such limitations see Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1926).
7. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
8. See, e.g., Falcone v. Joint Legislative Comm., 8 Misc. 2d 693, 168 N.Y.S.2d.
543 (1957); In re Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 176 N.E. 537 (1931);
Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938); NAACP v. Committee
of Offenses, 199 Va. 665, 101 S.E.2d 631 (1958).
9. See Jones v. Securities & Exch. Com'n, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D.
Penn. 1936); Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954). Pertinency is
a question of law properly decided by the court. Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 263 (1929); United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
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terfere if there is doubt as to pertinency or if there is still a possibility
of constitutional disposition by the legislature. 0 In an effort to further
define limitations on legislative investigations and to protect a witness
from running an undue risk of being held in contempt, the Supreme
Court of the United States has required the investigating committee to
make indisputably clear to the witness under interrogation the pertinency of the questions asked and the authority to inquire." When an
investigation invades areas involving free speech and other substantive
freedoms it becomes subject to closer scrutiny, and it is only when the
state's need for self-protection outweighs the individual's right to
privacy and personal liberties that the power to inquire into these
areas exists.' 2 There had been doubt whether membership lists of
organizations are entitled to constitutional protection from compulsory
disclosure by the state 3 until the Supreme Court of the United States
in NAACP v. Alabama14 held that the right to withhold such lists
would be protected until the state showed a sufficient need to interfere.15
A rehearing was denied in the instant case two weeks after the decision in Alabama, but there was no indication that the court deemed it
necessary to distinguish that case.1 6 In turning the decision on the
procedural point that the time to raise the question of whether an unlawful demand has been made by the committee is "when the inquiry
gets under way,"' 7 the court avoided the necessity of considering the
substantive questions posed either by the Alabama decision, or by two
earlier cases1 8 relied upon by the petitioner to show that the demands
in the subpoena violated certain rights. The court indicated that it
did not believe these cases supported the proposition but pointed out
that even if they did the question was raised prematurely. 19 The same
result has been reached by other courts prior to the Alabama case, but
10. See United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1947); Barsky v.
United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
11. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
12. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266-67 (1957) (concurring
opinion). For other cases where undue governmental prying was condemned
see Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 263 (1929); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
13. Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953). But see Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
14. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
15. Although the subpoena in the Alabama case was issued by a court rather
than a legislative committee, the Court indicated the protection would extend
to any type of state inquiry. Id. at 463.
16. The instant case was orginally decided approximately two weeks before
the Alabama decision.
17. 104 So. 2d at 18.
18. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); NAACP v. Patty, 159 F.
Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).

19. 104 So. 2d at 18.
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in those decisions the constitutional questions were considered even
though they were raised in the same procedural manner. 20
In many areas of the South, exposure of the membership lists of the
NAACP would make the organization difficult if not impossible to
operate.2 ' Where the inhibiting effect of the exposure is specifically
asserted by those resisting it, the courts should dispose of the merits
of.the claim in one way or another.2 It is true that courts should not
interfere with legislative bodies exercising their proper discretion, but
this should not prevent a court from questioning whether the legislature has invaded the constitutional rights of a group of individuals.
In the instant case the court allows the legislature, by threat of contempt proceedings, to demand the membership lists of an organization merely on the allegation that its unpopular, but legitimate views
may cause violent reaction. Thus, the court by precluding the assertion of constitutional claims effectively supports an investigation which
may amount to harassment of the NAACP. For this reason the decision appears unjust. It is probable, in view of the AZabama decision,
that the question would be resolved in favor of the petitioner in a later
contempt proceeding.

COURTS-PROCESS-IMMUNITY OF NONRESIDENT
DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACTIONS FROM
SERVICE OF STATE CIVIL PROCESS
Defendant, a resident of North Carolina, was convicted in the federal
district court in New York City of manipulating accounts of the plaintiff corporation, of which defendant was a stockholder and former
president, in order to defraud the federal government of taxes. As
he left the federal court he was served with process in a state civil action seeking damages for alleged acts which were substantially the
same as those leading to his conviction in the criminal prosecution. Defendant appeared specially and moved to set aside the service on the
ground that he was immune therefrom since he had voluntarily come
to New York to defend the criminal charge.' The special term granted
20. In re Joint Legislative Comm. to Investigate Educ. Sys. of New York,
285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769 (1941) (as to pertinency of the lists); NAACP v. Committee of Offenses, 199 Va. 665, 101 S.E.2d 631 (1958)

(as to infringement of

constitutional rights).
21. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Patty, 159 F.
Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
22. Robison, Protection of Association from Compulsory Disclosure of Mem-

bershipLists, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 615, 648 (1958).
1. No warrant or summons was ever served on defendant, who was in North
Carolina when indicted. Four days after indictment defendant surrendered to
the district court in New York City, pleaded not guilty, posted bail, was re-
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the motion. The appellate division reversed on the ground that under
a New York statute immunity ceases upon conviction. On appeal,
held, reversed. A statutory denial of immunity from civil process to
nonresident defendants, upon their extradition and criminal conviction,
does not exclude immunity under common law principles to those who
voluntarily appear to defend criminal proceedings. Thermoid Co. v.
Fabel, 4 N.Y.2d 494, 151 N.E.2d 883 (1958).
Nonresident litigants and witnesses are generally granted immunity
from service of civil process while in a jurisdiction for purposes of
attending to matters concerning litigation.3 This immunity was originally declared to be conferred as a privilege of the court in order to
secure the administration of justice free from outside interference or
influence. 4 In regard to the extension of such immunity to nonresident defendants in criminal prosecutions, the courts are sharply divided.5 By the weight of authority, a defendant voluntarily appearing
to answer a criminal charge, or in compliance with a bail bond, is exempt,6 since such appearance saves the state the expense and uncerleased and returned to North Carolina. Defendant returned to New York for
trial, withdrew his former plea and entered a plea of guilty to one count and
nolo contendere to the others. Bail was continued and defendant went back
to North Carolina returning again to New York where he was sentenced to
pay a $25,000 fine and was given a suspended jail sentence.
2. "A person brought into this state on or after waiver of extradition based
on a criminal charge shall not be subject to service of personal process in civil
actions arising out of the same facts as the criminal proceedings to answer
which he is being or has been returned until he has been convicted in the
criminal proceedings, or if acquitted, until he has had reasonable opportunity
to return to the state from which he was extradited." N.Y. CODE Cam. Pnoc.
§ 855. This statute is almost identical with § 25 of the UNIFoRm CRMINAL
EXTRADrIION ACT. 9 U.L.A. 258 (1957). The appellate division thought that defendant's situation was so similar to waiver of extradition that it should have
the same treatment. "New York State policy with respect to any person without
the state, who voluntarily surrenders and waives extradition on a state criminal charge, is now evident by the adoption in 1936 of Section 855 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. . . . We must hold that whatever immunity the defendant acquired was terminated upon the imposition of sentence." Thermoid
Co. v. Fabel, 4 App. Div. 2d 475, 167 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (1957). (Emphasis
added.)
3. Stewart v. Ramay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Nichols v. Horton, 14 Fed. 327
(N.D. Iowa 1882); Moseley v. Ricks, 223 Iowa 1038, 274 N.W. 23 (1937);
Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass. 499, 105 N.E. 363 (1914); Cooper v. Wyman, 122

N.C. 784, 29 S.E. 947 (1898). The rule is all but unanimous as to witnesses,

but there are some decisions which distinguish between nonresident plaintiffs
and nonresident defendants. Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234
(1921); Livengood v. Ball, 63 Okla. 93, 162 Pac. 768 (1916).
4. "Experience, however, has shown that in order that causes may be fully
heard, and the orderly administration of justice may be assured, it is necessary that parties, witnesses, and jurors shall be protected against service of
process in civil actions while they are in good faith in attendance upon the
trial of causes." Nichols v. Horton, 14 Fed. 327, 330 (N.D. Iowa 1882).
5. Annot., 14 A.L.R. 771 (1921); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 163 (1950).
6. Benesch v. Foss, 31 F.2d 118 (D.C. Mass. 1929); Cummins' Adm'r v.
Scherer, 231 Ky. 518, 21 S.W.2d 836 (1929); Jacobson v. Hosmer, 76 Mich. 234,
42 N.W. 1110 (1889); Michaelson v. Goldfarb, 94 N.J.L. 352, 110 Atl. 710 (1920);
Whited v. Phillips, 98 W.Va. 204, 126 S.E. 916 (1925); see 30 COLUm. L. Rzv.
265 (1930) (exemption of nonresidents under bail). Contra, Ryan v. Ebecke,
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tainty of extradition. On the other hand, one brought into a state by
extradition proceedings is generally not immune.7 An exception, dictated by consideration for the defendant, is generally made where
there is reason to fear abuse of process, as in cases where process is
served by the individual who procured the defendant's extradition. 8
The court in the instant case employed the majority common law
rule in granting the defendant immunity.9 However, since the appellate division had based its decision on a New York statute 0 the
court of appeals felt it only proper to set forth the reasons why such
statue was inapplicable. The statute by its terms deals with extradition only, and thus it literally does not include a defendant who was
not extradited, did not waive extradition, or was not brought into the
state, but returned voluntarily and surrendered. Further, an analysis
of the purposes of the statute showed that it was designed only to protect innocent nonresidents from service of civil process when brought
into the jurisdiction by extradition.' The court also expressed concern over the fact that this case involved service of process on a defendant involved in a federal criminal prosecution and reasoned that
comity suggested careful avoidance of an interference with a privilege
12
of the federal courts.
The decision as to whether or not a nonresident defendant in a criminal action will be immune from service of civil process depends largely
on the extent to which the court will draw an analogy to the rules
applicable to nonresident litigants and witnesses in civil actions. The
New York court apparently entertains the belief that immunity does,
in fact, induce nonresidents to appear voluntarily. If such inducement
102 Conn. 12, 128 Ati. 14 (1925); Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N.Y.

377, 90 N.E. 962 (1910).

7. Reid v. Ham, 54 Minn. 305, 56 N.W. 35 (1893); Martin v. Woodhall, 56
N.Y. Super. Ct. 439, 4 N.Y.S. 539 (1889) (defendant was extradited, and upon
arrival was served; plaintiff procured her arrest, but not in bad faith). Contra,

Bramwell v. Owen, 276 Fed. 36 (D.C. Ore. 1921).

8. Thomas v. Blackwell, 172 Okla. 487, 46 P.2d 509 (1935). Some courts
also grant the exception where the defendant is acquitted. Moletor v. Sinned,
76 Wis. 308, 44 N.W. 1099 (1890); cf. Church v. Church, 270 Fed. 361 (D.C. Cir.
1921) (immune for a reasonable time whether coming voluntarily or not).
Section 25 of the UNIFoRM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT adopted both of these
exceptions, and since the act has been enacted in thirty-four states the
majority rule would now apparently be that immunity will be granted
on extradition where the civil action arises out of the same facts as the
criminal proceedings.
9. "It should be sufficient ground for reversal that this case comes within the
spirit and terms of the common-law immunity rule which has existed 'from the
earliest times' and which expresses a 'privilege of the court' as well as of the
defendant (Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N.Y. 377, 380, 90 N.E. 962,
963, supra)." 4 N.Y.2d 494, 151 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1958). •
10. N.Y. CODE CRIV. PROC. § 855, supra note 2.
11. The court pointed out that although the New York decisions had never
allowed an abuse of the extradition process, still the governors of asylum states
would more readily sign extradition papers when confronted with a statute
specifically granting immunity. 4 N.Y.2d 494, 151 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1958).
12. 4 N.Y.2d 494, 151 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1958).
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does exist the decision in the instant case seems desirable. 13 Sound
public policy favors the encouragement of voluntary returns so as to
save the state the expense and trouble of extradition. Again, for some
offenses, extradition is not available,' 4 and in such a situation a nonresident defendant would not likely return without immunity from
civil process. The fact that a defendant is convicted and sentenced in
criminal proceedings should not affect his immunity where his original
return was voluntary.15 Further, comity strongly suggests immunity
in order to allow the federal court, as well as state courts, to benefit
16
from the defendant's voluntary return.

DAMAGES-INSTALLMENT VERDICT IN TORT ACTION
In a negligence action for personal injuries sustained in defendant's
store, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $36,000, to be paid
in monthly installments of $150 for a period of twenty years. After discharge of the jury the trial court struck as surplusage the qualification
as to method of payment. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, held, reversed, with instructions to render judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. After discharge of the jury a trial court
is without authority to strike that part of a verdict making tort
damages payable in installments, and such a verdict will not be invalidated on appeal, absent timely objections. M & P Stores, Inc. v.
Taylor, 326 P.2d 804 (Okla. 1955).
Since a judgment represents a final determination,' damages are
ordinarily stated in, terms of a single sum of money without further
13. But if most nonresidents are not in danger of being sued, or do not fear
such suits, or do not rely on the rapidly changing rules of immunity, it would
seem more conducive to justice to let those having rights against the nonresident enforce them in court.
14. Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant Based Upon
Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 NN. L. REv. 91 (1953) (pointing
out that sometimes offenses are not extraditable because the accused did not
"flee from justice").
15. See Bunce v. Humphrey, 214 N.Y. 21, 108 N.E. 95 (1915). "It is this
willingness to appear and aid the advancement of justice which should be rewarded and encouraged by exemption from service of process. ..

"

108 N.E. at

96.
16. But see State v. Taran, 91 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. 1958) where a nonresident
defendant in a federal criminal prosecution, while in St. Paul for the sole
purpose of defending the criminal action, was served with civil process by the
state in an action to recover delinquent taxes. In denying immunity .the court
said that comity was not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and
expediency and that the civil process would in no way conflict with or impede
the administration of justice in the federal court as to require application of
the principles of comity.
1. 30A Am. Jun. Judgments § 2 (1958). "We hold that a 'judgment' is .
the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action." Wells v.
Shriver, 81 Okla. 108, 197 Pac. 460, 480 (1921).
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provision for the adjustment of rights between the parties. There are,
however, situations where a single monetary figure has not proved
satisfactory. Very early, the equity courts adopted the installment
form rather than a single sum in certain types of alimony awards. 2
Periodic payment has also been authorized in workmen's compensation statutes3 and in statutes which allow an impoverished judgment
debtor to pay from his income or by installments.4 Two cases have
allowed installment judgments where the controversies involved school
boards and the satisfaction of the judgments might have to come from
taxes yet to be collected.5 In all of these examples except workmen's
compensation the prime motivation for allowing the payment of a
judgment in installments seems to have been the plight of the insolvent or financially embarrassed defendant.
The instant case is unusual in that an installment verdict is allowed
to stand in an ordinary tort action. There is no indication of what led
the jury to deliver the verdict in this form. The record showed that the
jury knew defendant had insurance 6 and consequently the jury could
have believed that he was financially able to meet a lump sum obligation. Therefore, some aspect of the plaintiff's situation must have inspired the jury to render such a verdict. In any event, it is unlikely,
at least in Oklahoma, that another installment verdict will be rendered
or accepted. The court indicates that it does not approve of such a
method of payment 7 and another installment judgment would probably not be upheld over timely objections.
There are obvious advantages in installment verdicts. For example,
a large judgment might force a defendant into bankruptcy if it had to
be paid immediately, whereas he could make small periodic payments
on the judgment in addition to meeting his other obligations. 8 On the
other hand, a court might feel a particular plaintiff incapable of manag2. 17 Am. JuR. Divorce and Separation § 560 (1957). "I am willing . . . to
direct a monthly allowance of $30 to the plaintiff... and that this allowance

continue until further order of the court." Mix v. Mix, 1 Johns. 108 (N.Y. Ch.
1814).

3. 58 Am. Jur. Workmen's Compensation § 3 (1948). See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1007 (1956) and ALA. CODE ANN.tit. 26, § 279 (1940).
4. See Annot., 111 A.L.R. 392 (1937). An example of this kind of statute
is N.J. REv. STAT. § 2 A: 17-64 (1952). It allows the court to direct the defendant to pay a judgment by installments and either party may make application at any time to modify the terms of the order.
5. Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 293 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1956) and Trustees
of Eddyville Graded Common Schools v. Board of Educ., 141 Ky. 126, 132 S.W.
182 (1910). In both cases the defendants had collected school taxes which
belonged to the plaintiffs as a result of mistakes. The 1956 case was clearly
equitable in nature but the 1910 case may have been a legal action.
6. 326 P.2d at 808.

7. Ibid.

8. See also footnote 4 supra. While the prime motivation for the installment
provisions may have been the impoverished debtor's position, the creditor's
interest was also considered and the creditor also used these laws as in
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E.2d 283 (1937).
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ing a large sum of money. There are also many problems in a judgment
of this type. The collection of many small debts and the satisfaction
-of the attorney's fees and court costs from these collections might
prove too much of a burden on the parties and the courts. Some form
of acceleration provision making the entire judgment due and payable might be necessary in the event of failure to meet a payment. In
such a case, it might be necessary for the court to retain jurisdiction
to carry out these provisions efficiently. Where law and equity are
joined in a jurisdiction, this should not be an insurmountable difficulty. More difficult problems will arise where the status of the
parties changes during the period in which the judgment is to be paid.
Death, bankruptcy, and/or sudden acquisition of wealth by the defendant could affect the situation to such an extent that redetermination of the method of payment would be desirable. Where consideration of the interests of the plaintiff is the reason for allowing payments by installments, the parties might be precluded from changing
the terms by settlement or agreement. 9 Economic fluctuations might
rob the plaintiff of his just compensation.10 Then, too, the plaintiff
would be losing the use of the balance until paid. This fact would
probably be reflected in the amount of the verdict awarded. It is
obvious that the right to receive a lump sum immediately is of more
value than the right to the same sum received over a long period of
time. Despite the many problems involved, there is reason to believe
such a judgment would be desirable and workable and should be used
when the circumstances so warrant. The plaintiff cannot complain, for
the alternative result of lump sum payment might be bankruptcy of the
defendant and complete escape from liability. Although it may be
possible for a court to find justification for installment judgments in
existing statutes," there will probably be very few, if any, installment
judgments without legislative action, especially in tort and contract
actions.
9. Analogous situations arise in both divorce proceedings and in workmen's
compensation cases. See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 299 (1933) for a discussion of
compromises and settlements affecting the payment of alimony. In a typical
case, Higgins v. Higgins, 119 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952), the court
said "the provision for the assignment of future alimony is void as against
public policy and is thus unenforcible. . . ." Some workmen's compensation
statutes do not leave this matter to judicial determination and contain explicit provisions. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1006 (1956), "[But all
settlements, before the same are binding on either party . . . shall be approved by the judge...."
10. See Daniel, The Purchasing Power of the Dollar and Tort Verdicts, 4
iVERCER L. REV. 249 (1953).
11. The installment judgment is not too different from a conditional judgment, the condition being the passage of time. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 73 (1947).
And, as pointed out in Kendrick & Roberts, Inc. v. Warren Bros. Co., 110 Md.
47, 72 Atl. 461, 465 (1909), a code provision that "The Court shall give judgment in all actions according as the very right of the cause and matter in law
shall appear to them, without regarding any matters of mere form. . . ." was
sufficient authority for giving a qualified judgment which included a perpetual stay of execution.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SEPARATION-SUIT BY
MENTALLY INCOMPETENT WIFE
In a suit for separation on the grounds of nonsupport, the plaintiff
wife alleged that although she had left defendant this did not constitute an abandonment so as to terminate defendant's duty of support
inasmuch as she was mentally ill, and did not comprehend the nature
of her acts., Defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds of plaintiff's lack of mental capacity to sue. The motion was denied. On appeal,
held, affirmed. A wife who is of unsound mind but not judicially declared insane may sue for separation even though mental incompetency
is alleged in her complaint. Sengstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y.2d 502, 176
N.Y.S.2"d 337 (1958).
At early common law, insane persons were incapable of maintaining
a suit in their own behalf since they lacked the necessary ability to
reason and comprehend.' Although there is still some recent authority
to this effect, 2 the majority of cases now hold that such a person can
sue or be sued providing he has not been adjudicated insane or placed
under guardianship. 3 If so adjudicated, suit may be brought through a
guardian or committee appointed to represent him.4 Irrespective of an
insane party's power to sue generally, it is the prevailing common law
rule that such a person cannot sue for divorce.5 This has been rationalized on the basis that divorce requires the active and affirmative volition of the innocent spouse and that an incompetent lacks the requisite
capacity to exercise proper discretion in the matter. 6 Furthermore,
since the right to sue for divorce is strictly personal to the aggrieved
spouse, such an action cannot be maintained by anyone in the insane
party's behalf.7 However, divorce actions have been allowed when
1. 28 Am. JuR. Insane and Other Incompetent Persons § 103 (1940); Annot.,

64 L.R.A. 513 (1904).

2. Parrish v. Rigell, 183 Ga. 218, 188 S.E. 15 (1936).
3. Zeigler v. Bark, 121 Wis. 533, 99 N.W. 224, 227 (1904); Menz v. Beebe,

95 Wis. 383, 70 N.W. 468 (1897); 28 Am. JuR. Insane and Other Incompetent
Persons § 103 (1940); Annot., 130 Am. St. Rep. 841 (1910).
4. Whitney v. Whitney, 229 Iowa 14, '293 N.W. 832, 835 (1940); Linderholm
v. Walker, 102 Kan. 684, 171 Pac. 603, 604 (1918); Schulz v. Oldenburg, 202
Minn. 237, 277 N.W. 918, 922 (1938).
5. Jackson v. Bowman, 226 Ark. 1312, 294 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1956); Bradford
v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78, 31 Am. Rep. 67 (1878); Quear v. Madison Cir. Ct., 229 Ind.
503, 99 N.E.2d 254 (1951); Dillon v. Dillon, 274 S.W. 217, 226 (Tex. 1925).
6. In re Application of Babushkin, 176 Misc. 911, 29 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (1941).
7. Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa 273, 61 N.W. 981, 983 (1895); Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 170 S.W.2d 889 (1943); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 146
S.W.2d 856, 857 (Md. 1940); Dillon v. Dillon, 274 S.W. 217 (Tex. 1925);
2 BIsHoP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 306a (6th ed. 1881); KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE § 749, at 799 (3d ed. 1946); Annots., 70 A.L.R. 964 (1931); A.L.R. 1284
(1944); 19 A.L.R.2d 182 (1951); But cf., Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279

S.W.2d 71 (1955) (where wife, who cross-complained for divorce from bed
and board, had been adjudged insane and this was known by the trial court,
it was presumed in an action by the wife's guardian to set the divorce decree
aside that the divorce court had reached the conclusion that wife had the
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plaintiff has not been adjudged insane and appears to know the nature
of the action taken, 8 sanity being presumed. 9 There is authority for
treating an action for separation differently from an action for divorce.10
Even one legally adjudicated insane has been allowed to sue for separation." The reasons often given for such a distinction are that since
the marriage relationship is not dissolved by separation, the hesitancy
to allow a divorce 12 disappears. Further, the necessity for protection
and maintenance of a spouse has been thought to be the same irrespective of sanity and mental competency.' 3
The instant case points up two problems which arise in separation
suits brought by one mentally incompetent. Is the plaintiff legally insane? If so, is a separation action distinguishable from a divorce action
so that an insane party can sue for separation? The court, in allowing plaintiff's action, based its holding on a broad general statutory
provision 14 to the effect that, unless judicially declared incompetent, 15
necessary capacity to testify and take oath and that he found she had the requisite personal volition to seek a divorce or separation).
8. In the case of Stephens v. Stephens, 143 Neb. 711, 10 N.W.2d 620, 622
(1943), the court laid down the following rule: "If a plaintiff in an action for
divorce reasonably understands the nature and purpose of such action, the
effect of his acts with reference thereto, and has the will to decide for himself
whether such action should be brought, he has sufficient mental capacity to
maintain such an action in his own name."
9. Stevens v. Stevens, 266 Mlich. 446, 254 N.W. 162 (1934); Smentek v.
Smentek, 46 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
10. Wray v. Wray, 33 Ala. 187 (1858); Mims v. Mims, 33 Ala. 98 (1858);
Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 176 N.E. 426, 427-28 (1931); Flynt v. Flynt,
237 N.C. 754, 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953); Birdzell v. Birdzell, 35 Kan. 638, 11
Pac. 907 (1886) (dictum indicating the court would allow a separation action
by an insane spouse although relief denied because petition filed in the form
of an action for divorce and alimony); 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 307
(6th ed. 1881).
11. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 176 N.E. 426 (1931).
12. The generally suggested reasons for this hesitancy to allow a divorce
are: 'Marriage is a personal status and relation ... and can never be created
... except with the free and voluntary consent of the parties assuming the
same, and it can never be dissolved or destroyed, while both parties are living,
...except for a grievous and essential wrong committed against such relation
by the other party, and with the free and voluntary consent, and.., with the
active and affirmative volition, of the wronged and innocent party. . . . There
are no wrongs that may be committed by a husband or wife sufficient in and
of themselves to work a dissolution of the marital ties. The injured party may
be willing to condone the wrong, or, for reasons satisfactory to himself or
herself, may. desire to continue the marriage relation, notwithstanding the
wrong.
'Many persons believe that marriage is a sacrament, and that to procure a
divorce upon any of the ordinary grounds for which divorces are usually
granted, is a violation of all true religion and morality. ... Besides, insanity
is often temporary; and what if such insane person should become restored
to sanity immediately after the divorce, and should disapprove the divorce and
all proceedings connected therewith?" Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433, 6 Pac.
561, 561-62 (1885).
13. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 176 N.E. 426 (1931); 2 BIsHOP, MARRIAGE
.ND DIVORCE § 307 (6th ed. 1881).
14. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 236.
15. The procedure for a lunacy proceeding is largely determined by local
statute. It is set in motion generally by a petition by a relative, although it
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a person may sue as an ordinary member of the community. Although
plaintiff was of unsound mind and this had been alleged in her complaint, since she had not been adjudged insane the court felt there was
no reason she could not sue generally. Thus, in answering the first
question in the negative, the court dispensed with the necessity of
answering the second. However, in the decision of the lower court,
it was pointed out that even if plaintiff had been so adjudged, she
could still maintain an action for separation through a committee or
16
guardian ad litem.
It would seem proper that a suit for separation should be maintainable by the insane spouse. The action for separation is independent
of the divorce statutes. It is a remedy which equity has derived for the
inadequacy of the doctrine of "agency by necessity" in forcing the
husband to care for his family. It does not involve dissolving the
marriage at all, but the enforcement of a property right in which the
court will order the husband to contribute to his wife's support by
periodic payments. 17 Since an insane party may enforce other property
rights, it would seem that there is no reason why she should not be
allowed to bring suit for separate maintenance, either in her individual
capacity or through a guardian where there has been an adjudication
of incompetency.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-HOBBS ACT-"ROBBERY"
PROVISION CONSTRUED AS REQUIRING PROOF OF
COMMON LAW ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE.
The Hobbs Act' provides, inter alia, for criminal punishment for
those who obstruct commerce by extortion or robbery. 2 The definition
of robbery given therein omits the common law requirements of an asportation and an intent to steal. 3 Appellants, who had obstructed the
may be started by a friend or officer of the state. The alleged lunatic has the
right to appear and defend himself and, in some jurisdictions, he is entitled to
a jury trial upon the issue of his sanity. Proceedings in insanity are invoked,
ordinarily, either for the purpose of securing a commitment to an institution
or for obtaining appointment of a guardian of the person. 28 Amw. JUR. Insane
and Other Incompetent Persons §§ 11-12 (1940).
16. Sengstack v. Sengstack, 7 Misc. 2d 1012, 166 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957).
17. Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73 S.E. 716 (1912).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1952).
2. The Hobbs Act also prescribes punishment for those who obstruct commerce by an attempt or conspiracy, to commit extortion or robbery and for
those who employ violence or threats of violence in furtherance of a plan
to violate the act. The defendants were not charged with employing violence
in furtherance of a plan to violate the act, although such a charge may have
been justified. See notes 3 and 13 infra.
3. "(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery
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movement of a truck in interstate commerce, were convicted of
robbery under the act in a federal district court 4 on evidence which
failed to show a taking and carrying away of goods and an intent
to keep them wrongfully.5 On appeal, held, reversed. In order to
establish commission of robbery under the Hobbs Act, all the elements
of common law robbery must be proved. United States v. Nedley, 255
F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958).
The Hobbs Act was passed as a replacement 6 for the Federal AntiRacketeering Act of 1934, 7 which prohibited the obtaining of money by
threats or force in connection with any act affecting commerce. However, the latter act excepted the payment of wages by a bona fide
employer to a bona fide employee, and this proved to be an escape
clause under the decision in United States v. Local 807, Teamsters'
Union. 8 The Supreme Court of the United States there held that the
Anti-Racketeering Act did not apply to defendants who required
truckers in interstate commerce to pay wages to local men if their
services were offered in good faith. That threats and violence were
used to obtain payment or that the services were declined were felt
not to alter this result. The Hobbs Act omitted this escape clause and,
as it appears from the House debate,9 the chief purpose in passing the
Act was to get around the sometimes maligned'0 holding in United
States v. Local 807. The definitions of robbery and extortion given
were taken substantially from the New York Penal Code.' Since the
or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
"(b) As used in this section"(1) The term 'robbery' means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by
means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or
future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or
the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in
his company at the time of the taking or obtaining." 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1952).
4. 153 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
5. Defendants striking truckers stopped a tractor-trailer, assaulted the
driver and his helper, and "interfered with" the contents of the truck. The
evidence did not show that the defendants moved the truck or took anything
from it. 255 F.2d at 352-53.
6. 91 CONG. REc. 11841-42, 11848, 11900 (1945).
7. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979.
8. 315 U.S. 521 (1942). For discussions of the Local 807 case see 54 HARV.
L. REv. 1400 (1941); 20 N.C.L. REV. 104 (1941); 16 TEmp. L.Q. 329 (1942); 90 U.
PA. L. REv. 972 (1942).

9. 91 CONG. REc. 11839-48, 11899-922 (1945). Several representatives recounted situations in which trucks were stopped, usually at the entrances to
large cities, by union drivers and helpers. The local men would then demand
payment for taking the truck to its destination in the city and, in some cases,
for unloading it. The demands were sometimes accompanied by threats or
force, and the services were not always rendered even though paid for.
10. See dissent of Chief Justice Stone, 315 U. S. at 539; 16 TEMP. L.Q. 329
(1942); 90 U. PA. L. REV. 972 (1942). See generally the House debate on the
Hobbs Bill, 91 CONG. REC. 11839-48, 11899-922 (1945).
11. 91 CONG. REC. 11842-43, 11900 (1945). N.Y. PEN. CODE §§ 2120, 2121.
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passage of the Hobbs Act the courts have on several occasions construed its extortion provisions 12 but the instant case is the first in
which a court's interpretation of the definition of robbery has been
3
the dispositive factor.'
The Government's contention 4 was that robbery as defined in the
Hobbs Act was different from robbery at common law 5 and that
proof of only those elements of robbery enumerated in the act would
sustain a conviction. In disagreeing with this contention and reversing
the judgment, the court relied heavily on legislative history, pointing
out that in the House debate on the bill its sponsor stated that the
definitions of robbery and extortion used were taken from the New
York Code and had been construed by the courts "a thousand times."' 6
Since New York courts had held prior to the passage of the Hobbs
Act that these provisions did not dispense with the common law requirements in proving robbery, 7 the court found that Congress did
not intend to dispense with these requirements. The court's opinion
is further braced by quotations from two Supreme Court cases,
Morissette v. United States 8 and United States v. Turley,19 to the
effect that where Congress uses common law terms in criminal
statutes, these terms will be given their established common law
meanings, unless the courts are otherwise instructed or the terms are
otherwise defined.
A presumption that Congress knew of these New York decisions
when it employed that state's statutory definition of robbery is
in accord with the normal approach utilized when a legislature adopts
the statute of another jurisdiction.20 The decision is also in line with
12. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956); United States v. Floyd, 228
F.2d 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 938, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 990
(1956); Callanan v United States, 223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.

862, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 926 (1955).
13. The Government in the district court agreed that for the defendants to
be convicted under the indictments the evidence had to sustain a finding that
there had been a robbery or an attempted robbery as defined by the Hobbs
Act, or a conspiracy to commit robbery. 255 F.2d at 353. The district judge
referred to the indictments as "loosely drawn." 153 F. Supp. at 892. The trial
court found the defendants guilty of robbery, but in the appellate court the
Government in its brief phrased the question as "whether or not the conduct
of the defendants amounted to an attempt to commit robbery." 255 F.2d at 354.
14. 255 F.2d at 354, 356.
15. According to the court, common law robbery is the felonious and forcible
taking from the person of another of goods or money by violence or putting
him in fear. 255 F.2d at 356. The prosecution must prove "forcible taking and
carrying away with the specific intent to steal personal property taken from the
person of another by violence or putting in fear, and with the intention to
permanently keep the property so taken." 255 F.2d at 357.
16. 255 F.2d at 355; 91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945).
17. People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926). See also People v.
Levan, 295 N.Y. 26, 64 N.E.2d 341 (1945); Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y.
359, 171 N.E. 569 (1930.

18. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
19. 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
20. E.g., Joines v. Patterson, 274 U.S. 544 (1927); Interstate Commerce
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the rule prescribing strict construction of a criminal statute. 21 Inquiry

into legislative debate to determine the intent of the legislature is not
unusual, although the value of such an inquiry in determining true
intent may at times be questionable.2 On the whole, the case rests
well on these considerations. But an interesting implication arises
from the application of common law meaning to the term "robbery."
Congress undoubtedly has the power to define the terms it uses and to
substitute its definitions for the common law meanings. 23 The cases
relied on by the court in support of the application of common law
meanings to terms used in a criminal statute seem to except situations
in which the statute defines the term24 or the court is "otherwise instructed"' ' as to its meaning. The court does not allude to these exceptions even though the term "robbery" was particularly defined in
the Hobbs Act. Therefore it seems a fair inference from this case that
if Congress intends to make the meaning of a common law criminal
term less restrictive it must not only define the term but must further
recite in the statute the intent to substitute the definition set forth for
the common law meaning.
Comm'n v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 220 U.S. 235 (1910); Melby v. Anderson,
64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135 (1936). See Note, 43 HARv. L. REV. 623 (1930).
21. But the rule should not override common sense. United States v. Brown,
333 U.S. 18, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 850 (1948). See generally 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 389 (1953).
22. Legislative intent can be a malleable thing in the hands of a court, and
delving into congressional debate may possibly result in a discovery of legislative manipulation rather than intent. For instance, the court did not refer
to the following exchange, which also took place [91 CONG. REc. 11900 (1945)]
on the floor of the House during debate on the bill:
Rep. EBERHARTER. "I am concerned whether or not this bill would change
the definition of robbery and extortion and conspiracy all over the United
States."
Rep. HANCOCK. "Only so far as interstate commerce is concerned, that is
all."
The indication from the Congressional Record is that this exchange took
place in general debate, however, and the statements of the author of the
bill may be more authoritative as to congressional intent. Cf. Wollcott v.
Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916) and cases there cited.
23. McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft Cooperative, 176 F.2d 633 (4th
Cir. 1949). Cf. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); Industrial Comm'n
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P.2d 560 (1939).
24. The quotation from the Turley case was: "We recognize that where a
federal criminal statute uses a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common
law meaning." 352 U.S. at 411. The court in the instant case does not discuss
the fact that the term "robbery" was otherwise defined in the Hobbs Act.
Another unanswered question is that of the purpose of Congress in including
a statutory definition of robbery in the act if it was intended that robbery
under the act should be the same as common law robbery. On the use and
effect of definition clauses see 2

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-

§§ 4814-4816 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
25. Part of the opinion in the Morissette case, quoted with approval in the
instant case, reads as follows: "And when Congress borrows terms of art in

STRUCTION

which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached
to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and
the meaning it will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."
342 U.S. at 263. The court in the instant case italicized for emphasis down to
the last three words.

1959 ]

RECENT CASES

TAXATION-INCOME-DETERMINATION OF "USEFUL LIFE"
OF A BUSINESS ASSET FOR PURPOSES OF DEPRECIATION.
The corporate taxpayer was engaged in the business of automobile
rentals. The automobiles werze generally disposed of after an average
business usage of twenty-six months. During 1954-56 they were depreciated for purposes of federal income taxation according to the
straight line method based upon a useful life period of four years (i.e.,
twenty-five per cent annual depreciation). Taxes were paid accordingly. Subsequently the taxpayer sought a refund, maintaining that
since assets involved had a useful economic life of four years, he could
have written them off under the declining balance method authorized
by section 167 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for those assets
having a useful life of at least three years. Under this method, the
assets could have been depreciated at an appreciably higher rate than
by the straight line method. The Commissioner, relying on newly
promulgated regulations, contended that under section 167 (c) useful
life is that period of time a taxpayer actually uses the asset in his business, and therefore the automobiles, being disposed of in twenty-six
months, did not have a useful life of at least three years. Held, refund
denied.' For purposes of determining whether a depreciable asset has
a useful life of at least three years, in order to qualify for the declining
balance method of depreciation under section 167 (c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, the period of time such asset is actually used
in the business, not its entire physically useful life, is controlling. Hertz
Corp. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1958).
One of the most disputed areas in present day tax law concerns the
deduction of a reasonable allowance 2 for depreciation. 3 Before the
adoption of new depreciation regulations in 19564 there had never
1. Since the court refused to apply the new depreciation regulations retro-

actively, the taxpayer was allowed a refund for 1954-55, but not for 1956, which

was after the issuance of the new regulations.
2. "The amount of the allowance for depreciation is the sum which should
be set aside for the taxable year, in order that, at the end of the useful life of
the plant in the business, the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with the
salvage value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the original cost." United
States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 300 (1927).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(b) provides three specific methods of computing depreciation; straight line, declining balance, and sum of the year'sdigits. It also allows any other method the application of which will produce
results not inconsistent with one of the three listed methods. See Lassers,
Depreciation Under the 1954 Code, 32 TAXES 695 (1954) for an analysis of
these methods.
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (1956). Previously tentative regulations had been
issued as Treas. Reg. § 1.167 and published in 19 FED. REG. 5490 (1954), but
were later withdrawn. This early regulation seemed to indicate that the Treasury Department intended to administer § 167(b) of the 1954 Code in the same
manner as the corresponding provision under the 1939 Code, inasmuch as the
provisions relating to useful life and salvage value were similar to those under
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (1)-1 (1953).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

been an official definition of the elements involved in depreciation,
(particularly "useful life" and "salvage value" 5), and taxpayers had
developed their own meanings for these terms from accounting principles.6 The useful life of an asset was commonly understood to be that
period of time over which the asset was functionally usable for the
task in which it was employed,7 and most taxpayers treated salvage
value 8 as synonymous with "residual" or "scrap" value. 9 There was
no statutory modification in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
indicated congressional dissatisfaction with this concept of useful life
and salvage value,10 but with the issuance of the new regulations these
two elements of a depreciation computation have taken on new meaning and a new importance. Since the enactment of the 1954 code those
taxpayers accustomed to selling assets used in their business prior to
the expiration of the asset's physically useful life have been quick to
utilize section 167 (b) (2) of the Code in conjunction with section 1231.11
The latter section permits capital gains treatment for the difference
between the selling price and the depreciated basis of certain assets
used in a trade or business. This was done even though the asset had
not been retained for three years and the depreciated basis was drastically decreased by the declining balance method. 12 Treasury Depart13
ment reaction to this practice has not been favorable.
5. There have been a few scattered cases in which the courts have made

a determination of either useful life or salvage value; the traditional accounting
definitions were usually accepted. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d
316 (5th Cir. 1956); Yellow Cab Co. v. Driscoll, 24 F. Supp. 993 (W.D. Pa
1938); Dorothy Caruso, 23 T.C. 836 (1955); Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co. v Commissioner, 9 T.C. 990 (1947).
6. See Note, 7 DRAKE L. REv. 32 (1957) for a discussion of the historical
implications of useful life and salvage value.
7. The new regulation describes useful life as "not necessarily the useful
life inherent in the asset but ...the period over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his . . . business. . . ." Treas.
Reg. § 1.167 (a) -1 (b) (1956). It is interesting to not the definition is phrased
as though it were necessary to dispel a previous understanding to the contrary.
8. Salvage value is "the amount (determined at the time of acquisition)
which it is estimated will be realizable upon sale ... when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's ... business. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a) -1 (c) (1956).
9. There are even indications that it had become a practice for revenue
agents to disregard salvage value in auditing tax returns. See, e.g., Koelling
v. United States, 57-1 U. S. Tax Cas. ff 9453 (D. Neb. 1957).
10. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167, with INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch.
1, § 23 (1).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
12. To illustrate, assume the A company bought an automobile in 1954 at
a cost of $2000. The basis used for depreciation was' cost without any reduction for salvage value. Although the useful physical life was determined to be
four years, the practice of the A company was to operate its autos for only two
years before replacing them. By using the declining balance method, at the
end of two years the asset would be depreciated by $1500 and the adjusted
basis would then be $500. If the automobile was sold for $800, the $300 difference between the selling price and the adjusted basis was taxable as capital
gain under § 1231 at 25% rather than as ordinary income in the taxpayer's regular bracket.
13. See, e.g., Robley H. Evans, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 639 (1957). In addi-
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The argument of the taxpayer in the instant case was that when an
interpretation has become seasoned from long continued acceptance,
and when its underlying statute is reenacted 14 by Congress without
change, the interpretation in vogue is conclusive of congressional intent. 15 Hence, not only could the new regulation not be applied retroactively, but it would have no validity whatever. 16 The court accepted
the conclusion as to the non-retroactive nature of the regulation" and
allowed a refund for the years of 1954 and 1955, but rejected the argument that reenactment of the statute in light of long continued acceptance of the old interpretation is necessarily conclusive as to the intent
of Congress. Thus the validity of the regulation hinges on the question of statutory interpretation with the resulting attempt to determine
legislative intent. The fact of reenactment, committee reports pursuant to such renactment, 18 judicial interpretation, Treasury Department interpretation, 19 and the inclusion of the new declining balance
method in the 1954 Code are all relevant in this inquiry. The new
definitions of useful life and salvage value approved in the instant case
may, however, frustrate the broadly expressed purpose of Congress
in allowing the declining balance method. 20 They are certainly contion to the promulgation of the new regulations, the Commissioner has argued
in some cases that the taxpayer holds the assets not only for use in his business but also primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business. This approach received a setback in the case of Philber Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956). See also Massey
Motors, Inc. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
14. See Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARv.
L. REV. 377 (1941) for a discussion of the effect of reenactment.
15. Cf. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939); Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953); Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d
995; (2d Cir. 1927; St. Louis Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 411 (D. Del.
1955). See Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the
Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 556 (1940).
16. See St. Louis Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 411 (D. Del. 1955).
17. Since the statute of limitations had not yet run on several taxable years
under the 1939 Code when the new regulations were published, the Treasury
Department has challenged some depreciation deductions under the old law,
insisting that the new definitions have in fact been the law all the time. See,
e.g., Philbert Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956);
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1027 (1956).
18. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
19. INT. REV. BULL. F. (1920, revised 1942), republished as INT. REV. SER. PUB.
173 (1955), which is published as a guide to what the Department considered
a reasonable normal period of useful life for various assets, has always had
language indicating approval of the old definitions.
20. It should be noted that the new definitions will restrict the amount of
depreciation that can be taken under the other methods of computation permitted by § 167(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, for in all instances
now where the asset will probably be disposed of prior to the expiration of its
physically useful life, a sizable salvage value (resale value) will have to be deducted in advance. This is hard to rationalize in light of Congress' avowed
intent to accelerate tax-free recovery of costs in the interest of economic
growth, increased production, and a higher standard of living. See H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). Cf. Taynton, Effect of Salvage Value on
Depreciation,36 TAXES 97 (1958).
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trary to well established accounting principles, 21 and will result in a
reappraisal of some depreciation practices.22 The new definitions will
have the greatest impact on taxpayers who dispose of assets while still
in good operating condition.
The Treasury Department has adopted the general policy of accepting the judgment of the taxpayer on depreciation matters unless the
23
facts in the case furnish a clear and convincing basis for adjustment.
The fact that the same method of depreciation was unchallenged in
previous years does not preclude adjustment now if the facts so warrant.24 By rejecting the Commissioner's argument that the new interpretation of useful life and salvage value has been the law all along,
the court necessarily implies that Congress changed the interpretations
in 1954. Weighing the results of overturning definitions long accepted
by the courts, the Commissioner, accountants, and taxpayers alike in the absence of specific statutory authorization-against the closing
of a tax loophole of something less than alarming proportions, the decision seems at best ill supported and calls for judicial or legislative
25
clarification.

TAXATION-INCOME-FULL PAYMENT OF TAX DEFICIENCY
AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SUIT FOR REFUND
A tax deficiency of almost $29,000 was assessed against the petitioner
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the taxpayer's 1950 federal income tax return. Rather than challenging the assessment in the
Tax Court before payment, the petitioner paid over $5,000 and then
21. In determining useful life and salvage value the court should disregard
its present knowledge and base its findings only upon those facts and circumstances that were available for the taxpayer to consider at the time he was
supposed to have made an estimate. See, e.g., Leonard Refineries, Inc., 11
T.C. 1000 (1948).

22. Under the new definitions the selling price of the used asset should result in a negligible amount of gain or loss. Such a theory has been criticized
from an accounting viewpoint in that it ignores the fact that fixed assets wear
out regardless of fluctuation of market values, and the resulting cost expiration is an operating expense. See FINNEY & M1ILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING
(Intermediate) 440-41 (4th ed. 1951).
23. Rev. Rul. 90, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 43; REv. Rul. 91, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 44.
It is interesting to note that Rev. Rul. 54-229, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 124, sanctions
the very practice forbidden by the instant case.
24. Rev. Proc. 57-18, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 748.
25. If Congress intended to eliminate gains from the sale of depreciable
property used in the business by authorizing the restrictive regulations
approved in the instant case, it seems inconsistent that it was found necessary
and desirable to enact § 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which permits such capital gain treatment. Robley H. Evans, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 639
(1957), a case almost identical to the instant one (and reaching the same result), has been appealed to the ninth circuit.
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commenced an action in the federal district court for a refund.' With
some reluctance2 the district court took jurisdiction and denied the
refund. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction in that the full amount of the deficiency had not been paid.3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, affirmed. A taxpayer must pay the full amount
of a tax deficiency assessed against him before he can bring an action
in the federal district court for refund. Flora v. United States, 375
U. S.63 (1958).
Both textwriters and practitioners have long assumed that there
are alternative procedures in tax deficiency cases of either bringing
an action in the Tax Court to challenge the assessment prior to payment or of making the payment and then bringing an action for a
refund in the federal district court. 4 "Pay first and litigate later" has
become an oft quoted rule of thumb in conjunction with the latter
procedure.5 The precise meaning of this phrase, however, has been
shadowed with uncertainty as to whether or not the requirement of
prior payment will be satisfied by partial payment. There is no ambiguity on the face of the jurisdictional statute in its authorization of
suit for the recovery of "any ... tax," "any penalty," or "any sum." 6
It would seem that a literal interpretation of these broad and all-inclusive terms would not require full payment. Prior to the instant decision the court of appeals of three separate circuits considered this
matter and each rejected the requirement of full payment. On the
other hand, in addition to the court of appeals decision in the instant
case,8 support of the full payment doctrine is to be found in one recent
1. Prior to bringing this action the taxpayer had submitted a claim to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue which had been refused.
2. The district court felt that the case should be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. However, in view of the fact that the court of appeals had not
ruled on this issue the district court considered the case on the merits. Flora
v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 602 (D. Wyo. 1956).

3. The pertinent jurisdictional statute reads as follows:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the Court of Claims, of:
"(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected
under the internal-revenue laws. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1), (1952), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (1) (Supp. III, 1956).
4. STANLEY & KILCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 358 (3d ed. 1955).

5. The Court denominates the phrase as the "Cheatham principle." 357 U.S.
at 75. See Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439, 456 (1938) (concurring opinion).
6. See statute quoted note 2 supra. The Court itself recognizes the "clear
authorization" of the statute when it suggests the need to look further to the
legislative history. 357 U.S. at 65.
7. Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956); Sirian Lamp
Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941); Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d
609 (2d Cir. 1940).
8. Flora v. United States, 246 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1957).
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federal district court case,9 certain dicta in an 1876 decision of the
Supreme Court,' 0 and three court of appeals cases which are not
directly on point."
In the instant case the Supreme Court rules for the first time on the
precise meaning of the principle "pay first and litigate later." By
deciding that full payment is a condition precedent to maintaining an
action for refund, the Court resolves the conflict which had arisen
between the circuits.12 It affirms the decision of the Tenth Circuit but
holds contra to the conclusion reached by the three circuits which
had considered this matter prior to the instant case. 13 To reach its
present decision, the Court traces the language of the present jurisdictional statute back to the Revenue Act of 1866.14 Strong emphasis
is placed on the case of Cheatham v. United States15 which is interpreted as setting forth the requirement of full payment. 16 Then, by
looking at the legislative history of subsequent amendments to this
early act, the Court assumes that no change was intended since the
full payment requirement was not specifically mentioned in legislative
debate. Knowledge of and acquiescence in this requirement as set
forth in the Cheatham dicta 17 is attributed to Congress, the Treasury
Department, and the taxpayer. Further support is gained from the
Court's assumption that no case prior to 194018 had been brought without first paying the full amount of the government's claim.
There appear compelling reasons why a rehearing should be granted
in this case. The assumption that Congress knew of this requirement
of full payment and understood its implications from an 1876 decision,
not in point, seems unwarranted. Furthermore, it is questionable
whether the actual practice of the Treasury Department and the tax9. Rogers v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
10. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1876) (full payment had been
made prior to bringing the action).
11. Bendheim v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1954) (decided on the
right to appeal to the Tax Court; McConkey v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 892
(4th Cir. 1952) (decided on the right to appeal to the Tax Court); Suhr v.
United States, 18 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1927). The Sutu" case was decided on the
basis that refund action could not be brought after petition had been filed in
the Board of Tax Appeals. In a later case, this same court reversed a district
court decision which had denied jurisdiction on the authority of the Suhr
case. Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.), reversing 36 F. Supp.
539 (D.N.J. 1941).
12. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 357 at 64.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. Stat. 152 (1866).
15. 92 U.S. 85 (1876).
16. The most direct statement to be found in the Cheatham case in support
of the full payment doctrine reads as follows, "The objecting party .

.

. can

pay the amount claimed, and commence his suit at any time within that period." 92 U.S. at 89. It might be argued that the Court did not in fact give full
consideration to a situation where action was brought after only partial payment.
17. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1876).
18. The date of Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940).
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payer during the period prior to 1940 was in fact in accord with the
acceptance of the full payment doctrine which the Court found to
exist. 19 There appear to be no sound policy arguments in favor of full
payment. In the decision itself the Court recognizes that hardships
may result from this rule, particularly in those cases where the taxpayer cannot make full payment due to financial considerations and
where suit has been barred in the Tax Court by the statute of limitations.20 This unhappy situation the Court meets with the argument
that if Congress had intended any change from the existing policy of
full payment it would have so provided through appropriate legislation. 2' In view of the serious questions which have been raised as to
the existence of a contrary policy it would appear that the above argument would compel the Court to thoroughly reconsider the basis for
its decision. Tax litigation during the past few years has multiplied
tremendously in scope and importance. Here is a relatively new and
progressive field of the law which shows every sign of continued
growth. It would seem unfortunate that this area should be clouded
by restrictions based upon archaic dicta which the Court reads into an
otherwise clear and unambiguous statute.

TAXATION-INCOME-REDEMPTION OF CORPORATE STOCK
AS EQUIVALENT TO TAXABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
DIVIDENDS TO REMAINING SHAREHOLDER
The petitioning taxpayer acquired a fifty per cent interest in the
Holsey Corporation, operator of an Oldsmobile dealership, by exercising an option granted to him by the Greenville Company, which
was controlled by taxpayer's father. Petitioner subsequently received
a second option from Greenville which permitted him or a corporation
in which he owned at least fifty per cent of the common stock to purchase the remaining shares for $80,000. The taxpayer assigned this
option to the corporation which redeemed the stock, paying Green19. These arguments are cogently set forth in a petition for rehearing which
has been filed with the Court. As yet there has been no determination of
whether a rehearing will be granted. However, the Solicitor General has been
requested to file a response to the petition for rehearing. 27 U.S.L. WMX 3134
(Oct. 27, 1958) (No. 492, 1957 Term). After searching the statements of fact
in pre-1940 tax cases, petitioner has uncovered numerous cases where recovery
was permitted after only partial payment including two cases which were
heard before the Supreme Court itself. In none of these cases did the government challenge jurisdiction nor did the court consider this matter on its own
motion. For this reason these cases are not reported as involving the full payment issue. See cases cited in Petition for Rehearing, p. 5 n.5.
20. 357 U.S. at 75.
21. 357 U.S. at 75-76.
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ville therefor.' Taxpayer was thus left the sole owner of the corporation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue urged that the purpose
of the redemption of Greenville's stock was to allow the taxpayer to
gain control of the corporation without cash outlay and sought to tax
the payment as a constructive dividend to the taxpayer. The Tax
Court 2 found that the redemption of stock was instituted in accord-

ance with a plan to use corporate earnings for the personal benefit of the taxpayer and was therefore taxable to him as a distribution
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" under section 115 (g) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 3 On petition for review, held, reversed.
Where a corporation distributes earnings to one shareholder by redeeming his stock, the distribution cannot be treated under section
115 (g) (1) as a taxable dividend to a remaining shareholder who thereby gains control of the corporation but who neither receives any part
of the amount distributed nor is under any obligation which is discharged by such distribution. Holsey v. Commissioner,258 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1958) .4

Section 115 (c) of the 1939 Code provides that any distribution in redemption of stock 5 is a distribution in liquidation and thus entitled to
capital gain treatment.6 Section 115 (g), an exception to this rule, was
1. The option was assigned to the corporation and exercised in 1951. From
the time the second option was granted in 1946 through 1951, the earned surplus and yearly cash dividends of the corporation were as follows:
YEAR

SURPLUS

DIVIDENDs

YEAR

SURPLUS

DIVIDENDS

1946 ....... $80,687 ......... $2,000 1949 ....... $239,583 ......... $4,000
$4,000
$2,000 1950 ....... $306,979 ........
1947 ...... $163,537 ......
$6,000
$4,000
1951 ....... $351,738 .........
1948 .......
$183,851 .........
2. Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957).
3. Section 115 (g) (1) provides as follows:
"If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock
was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such a manner as to make
the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed
in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents
a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall
be treated as a taxable dividend." INT. REV. CODE OP 1939, § 115(g) (1), 53

Stat. 48.
4. The Commissioner acquiesced in the result of this case, Internal Revenue
Service Technical Information Release No. 109, Oct. 30, 1958; and the Justice
Department did not appeal.
5. The distinction between "redemption" and "repurchase" which exists in
the field of corporation law is not applied in income taxation. The Internal
Revenue Code treats stock as redeemed when a corporation acquires its stock

from a shareholder in exchange for property. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 317 (b).
A corporation may repurchase its stock in most jurisdictions. Only two
states follow the English rule which prohibits redemptions altogether. A few
states allow corporations to purchase shares out of capital when no prejudice
to other shareholders or creditors results, but most jurisdictions permit corporations to purchase only out of surplus. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-117 (1956).
For discussion of the problems of corporation law relevant to stock redemptions, see generally, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 256-58 (1946); O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS §§ 7.11-13 (1958); Nemmers, The Power of a Corporation to
PurchaseIts Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 161; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1177 (1950).
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 115Cc), 53 Stat. 48.
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meant 7 to prevent the use of the stock redemption process to get earnings out of the corporation and into the hands of the shareholders
at capital gain rates when the stockholders retain essentially the same
interests in the corporation that they had before the redemption.3
Moreover, it has been suggested that section 115 (g) was intended to
prevent only the shareholder whose stock is being redeemed from
avoiding taxation at dividend rates. 9 Though the statutory language,
"distribution ... essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend," is obviously broad enough to cover the taxation of a redemption payment to a retiring stockholder as a constructive dividend
to the remaining shareholders, there is no indication that the draftsmen of the section contemplated such a result.'0
7. See Nolan, The Uncertain Tax Treatment of Stock Redemptions: A Legislative Proposal,65 HARv. L. REv. 255, 256 (1951); H. R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1925); H. R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1925); S. REP.
No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1925).
8. The simplest examples of a redemption equivalent to a dividend under
§ 115(g) are: (1) a distribution of earnings by the corporation through the repurchase of stock from shareholders on a pro rata basis; (2) a redemption of
part of the stock of the sole owner of the corporation. Neither of these distributions affects the proportionate interest of the shareholders in the corporation.
However, the cases interpreting this section developed a rule of law that
if there is a genuine contraction of business (a partial liquidation)--even
though the distribution is made on pro rata basis-or if there is a distribution
which terminates the stockholder's interest, the funds received are entitled
to capital gain treatment. Whether or not a redemption is equivalent to a
dividend in cases not falling within this rule is a question of fact. Relevant
factors include: existence of a business purpose; corporation or shareholder
initiation of the redemption; past dividend record; extent of change in control
of the corporation. See 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcovm TAxAT N § 9.1 (1956); Note,
67 YALE L.J. 112, 113 n.7, (1957).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 302 extends capital gain treatment
to proceeds received in redemption of stock if the redemption: (1) is not essentially equivalent to a dividend; (2) is substantially disproportionate; (3)
terminates a shareholder's interest. If one of these criteria is not satisfied, the
distribution is taxed as a dividend to the extent that it is derived from earnings. See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 346 (stock redemptions in partial liquidation taxed as capital gain); id. §§ 302(c), 318 (application of rules of constructive ownership); id. § 317 (b) ("redemption" occurs whether stock cancelled, retired or held as treasury stock).
The 1954 Code was probably meant to codify rather than change existing
law in regard to stock redemptions. See S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
233-34 (1954); Bittker, Stock Redemptions and PartialLiquidations Under the
InternalRevenue Code of 1954, 9 STAw. L. Rav. 13 (1956). The Commissioner's
acquiescence in the instant case seemingly recognizes that "essentially equivalent to a dividend" has the same meaning in both the 1939 and the 1954
codes at least in regard to the taxation of redemptions as constructive dividends
to surviving shareholders. See note 18 infra.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. See note 7 supra. See also Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.115(g)-1 (1954): "a cancellation or redemption by a corporation of all of the stock of a particular
shareholder, so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in the affairs of the
corporation, does not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend."
During the drafting of § 302 of the 1954 Code, the Senate Finance Committee was confronted with the question of taxing the remaining shareholder
and was asked to clearly indicate such an intent in the legislative history of
the section if it contemplated such a result. There is nothing in subsequent
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There are a number of variations of close corporation stock redemption arrangements," and, whether so intended or not, each enables a
shareholder to gain control of a corporation while avoiding taxation
which would otherwise be incidental to such an acquisition. The alternative to the stock redemption method of acquiring control is dixect
purchase of the stock by the remaining shareholder. 12 In order to
finance the purchase, the buyer must usually take down enough of the
corporation's earnings in the form of dividends to permit him to retain
an amount after taxation equivalent to the purchase price of the outgoing shareholder's stock. The result of this type transaction is that
the remaining shareholder sustains dividend income and the value
of the corporation is reduced by the amount of the dividend payments.
But if there is a redemption, the value of the corporation is reduced
only by the amount of the repurchase price of the stock, and the surviving shareholder is not required to pay tax until he sells his stock,
at which time he has the advantage of capital gain rather than divi13
dend rates.
legislative history indicating such an intent. Hearings Before Committee on
Finance of the United States Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 517 (1954).
11. Agreements often require the corporation to purchase deceased or retiring shareholders stock in order to insure harmonious continuation of the
business. Where the remaining shareholders are unable or unwilling to purchase the stock, such agreements prevent the necessity of choosing between
three equally undesirable consequences: a sale of unmarketable close corporation stock at reduced prices; unwilling participation in business; separation of ownership and management. Corporations often fund redemption
agreements by taking out life insurance policies on its shareholders.
Redemptions may also be utilized to provide stock for sale to key employees or to allow the sale of a corporation to a third party who does not
have sufficient capital to finance the transaction.
See generally,

O'NEAL, CLOSE

CORPORATIONS §§ 7.10, 7.27-28, 9.03-05 (1958);

Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunierand Casale, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 339 (1958); Note, Income Tax Problems in the Use of Stock Redemptions
to Purchase A Corporation Out of Future Earnings, 67 HAnv. L. REv. 1387
(1954); Note, Stock Redemptions in Close Corporations:A Plan For Taxation,
67 YALE L.J. 112 (1957).
12. Dissolution of the corporation provides another means for a third party
to acquire the business assets after they have been distributed at capital gain
rates. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 1.07, 8.17 (1958). However, many
disadvantages attend such a liquidation. See Note, 67 YALE L.J. 112, 120 n.38
(1957).
13. The instant case illustrates the tax advantages of the redemption method
over the direct purchase method:
(1) Under a typical direct purchase plan, the remaining shareholder in
the instant case might have exercised his option to purchase the stock from
the outgoing shareholder for $80,000, payable in eight annual installments of
$10,000. If his normal yearly tax rate were 38%, he would have to take down
roughly $20,000 per year in dividends in order to retain $10,000 (his marginal
tax rate would increase from 38% to approximately 50% because of increased
earnings) with which to pay the yearly installments-paying $80,000 in dividend tax over the course of the eight years.
Assuming, arguendo, an addition to the corporation's earned surplus of $130,000 for the eight-year period, the corporation would have an earned surplus
after eight years of $320,000 ($350,000 in the first year of the period plus $130,less $160,000 paid to remaining shareholder in dividends). See note 1 supra. If
the remaining shareholder then sells the corporation at book value, he will pay
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The Commissioner has ordinarily been unsuccessful in taxing remaining shareholders except in one type of redemption situation. This
exception is illustrated in the leading case of Wall v. United States14
where it was held that a surviving stockholder sustains constructive
dividend income under section 115 (g) (1) when he obligates himself
to purchase stock of a retiring shareholder and the corporation subsequently discharges his obligation by redeeming the stock. The court
reasoned that this arrangement is equivalent to the payment of the taxpayer's obligation by a third party.'5

The Commissioner's early ef-

forts to tax surviving stockholders in other situations were unsuccessful;16 and when the Tax Court did adopt the Commissioner's position in 1953, the courts of appeal usually reversed its decisions. 17 The
Internal Revenue Service, by its acquiescence in the instant case, has
retreated from its former position and will probably no longer treat
a distribution in redemption as a dividend to remaining shareholders
merely because the shareholders' percentage interests in the corpora18
tion are increased.
a capital gains tax of $60,000 (25% of the remainder of $320,000 less adjusted
basis of $80,000 paid for stock). Total tax on the transaction is $140,000 ($60,000 in capital gains plus $80,000 dividend tax.)

(2) By the redemption method, the remaining shareholder received a
corporation in 1951 whose earned surplus was $270,000 ($350,000 less $80,000
distributed to retiring shareholder). If the taxpayer keeps the corporation
for the same eight years, assuming the same hypothetical $130,000 addition to
surplus, and then sells his stock at book value, he would pay a capital gains
tax of $100,000 (25% of the sum of $270,000 plus $130,000). Total tax is $100,000 as compared to $140,000 under direct purchase method.
14. 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947), 46 IVIcH. L. REv. 1002 (1948). Similar cases
are Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955); Frank P. Holloway, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1257 (1951), af'd 203 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1953). But
see Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing 23 T.C. 115
(1954).
15. 164 F.2d at 464.
16. Fox v. Harrison, 145 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1944); Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13
(1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 4, 53 COLuIVt. L. REV. 881 (1953); Fred F. Fisher,
6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 520 (1947); Lloyd H. Diehl, 1 T.C. 139; (1942); S. K. Ames,
Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1020 (1942), acq., 1942-1 Cum. BuLL. 1; A. M. Lawrence, 13
B.T.A. 463 (1928).
17. See Henry E. Prunier, 28 T.C. 19 (1957), rev'd, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1957) (insurance premiums to fund corporate entity plan); Sneed, note 11
supra; Joseph P. Schmitt, 20 T.C. 352 (1953), rev'd, 208 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1954)
(corporate redemption leaving minority stockholders in control), 67 HAv. L.
REv. 1266 (1954). See also Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957),
rev'd, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Oreste Casale, 26 T.C. 1020 (1956) rev'd,
247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), 11 VANi. L. REV. 237 (1957). But see Louis H. Zipp,
28 T.C. 314 (1957), ajfd, 259 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1958).
18. Internal Revenue Service, Technical Information Release, No. 109, Oct.
30, 1958. The IRS further stated in its release that it is not retreating from its
position in Wall v. United States, note 14 supra,and Zipp v. Commissioner, note
17 supra; and made it clear that if the stock is in reality purchased by a remaining shareholder and paid for by the corporation, then regardless of the form
of the transaction, the payment will be considered a dividend to the shareholder who made the purchase.
Caveat: The Commissioner's retreat in stock redemption cases has often
times been shortlived. For example he has subsequently argued a position
contrary to his acquiescences in Edenfield and Ames, note 16 supra.
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In the principal case, the court held that the motive or purpose of
a redemption is irrelevant in determining whether the distribution has
the effect of a dividend. 19 Thus, no significance was attached either
to the Tax Court's finding that the redemption was a planned use of
corporate earnings for the personal benefit of the taxpayer or to the
taxpayer's argument that the redemption subserved a valid business
interest of the corporation.20 Instead, the court said that the effect of
the redemption is not equivalent to the payment of a dividend because
the taxpayer "realized" no income from the transaction. 21 The Court
concluded that the very fact that the taxpayer substantially increased
his proportionate interest in the corporation militates against dividend
equivalence since the distribution of a true dividend leaves the proportionate interests of the shareholders of a corporation relatively unchanged.2
The court's rejection of motive or purpose as a test in determining
dividend equivalence and its insistence that the formalities of the
stock redemption process excuse the remaining shareholder from a
tax that he would otherwise have to pay are subject to criticism. The
c@urt's argument seems to begin with the truism that both an ordinary
dividend made directly to a taxpayer and a redemption distribution
made in order to enable a taxpayer to gain control of a corporation represent the outlay of corporate funds for the personal benefit of the taxpayers. But the court then reasons that the motive test is irrelevant
because the benefit to the taxpayer in the normal dividend situation is
"realized" whereas no such "realization" is present in the redemption
situation. However, the taxpayer's benefit in the instant case seems
no less "realized" than are other benefits arising out of payments to
a third party which are treated as a "constructive" dividend to the
taxpayer. 23 If it is recognized that the taxpayer does "realize" a
19. 258 F.2d at 869.

20. The taxpayer argued that its Oldsmobile franchise was in jeopardy because General Motors had expressed disapproval of the fact that Greenville
owned one half of the corporation's stock. The Tax Court, refusing to follow
Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955) (protection of franchise
held valid corporate purpose), held that it required no corporate act to remedy
the situation.
21. 258 F.2d at 868.
22. Id. at 868-69.
23. See authorities cited in note 14 supra; Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138
(1954), aff'd 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956); Clark v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 725

(3d Cir. 1936); Sneed, note 11 supra, at 347-53. See also Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940), where the Court said in regard to the rule that income

is not taxable until realized:
"The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement of tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually the
receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where
the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money or property."
For some discussions of this problem, suggesting relaxation of the strict

realization rule, see Bittker, Charitable Gifts of Income and The Internal Rev-
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benefit from a stock redemption, the question then becomes whether
all such benefits should be taxed. While all redemptions may result in
the same benefits to the remaining shareholders, it is doubtful that all
should receive the same treatment. Many redemptions, entered into
for valid business reasons quite unrelated to any personal or investment benefits which accrue to the shareholders, are, in a sense, thrust
upon the remaining shareholders. 24 Thus, in establishing whether a
distribution in redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend, it
seems helpful to determine whether the redemption is made for valid
corporate reasons or purely for the benefit of the remaining shareholders. Moreover, to allow a few close corporation shareholders to
avoid taxation by a process that is not available to most corporate
shareholders25 seems to contradict an underlying principle of income
taxation that equals should be taxed equally. But in view of the similarity between sections 302 (b) (1)2 of the 1954 Code and 115 (g) (1) of
the 1939 Code, the Commissioner's acquiescence in the instant case indicates that stock redemptions will continue to provide a means for remaining shareholders to increase their proportionate corporate interests without sustaining dividend taxation 2 7
enue Code: Another View, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1375 (1952); Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and The Internal Revenue Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 84
(1951); Surrey, The Supreme Court and The Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779 (1941).
24. See note 11 supra.
25. The shareholders of public corporations are usually unable to use the
redemption process. And not every shareholder of a close corporation can
take advantage of the arrangement. For example, where a father and son
own equal interests in a close corporation and the father dies, a redemption
by the corporation of the shares held in the father's estate would be taxed

as ordinary income to the estate if the son is one of its beneficiaries. The attri-

bution rules of § 318 combined with § 302 cause such a result.
26. "Subsection (a) [redemptions shall be treated as a sale or exchange of
stock] shall apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (1).

27. A short commentary agreeing with the court's decision and reasoning in
the instant case appears in 72 HARV. L. REv. 776 (1959).

